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Sabrina Buti
Job Market Candidate 2006/2007

PhD Candidate in Economics
MPSE - Toulouse University

E-mail: sabrina.buti@sifr.org
Phone: +46-8-728 51 21
Mobile: +46-76-247 71 84
Fax: +46-8-728 51 30

Curriculum Vitae (PDF-file).
Working Papers


Research Interests

  • Market Microstructure
  • Contract Theory
  • Regulation of Financial Markets
  • Corporate Finance

References

  • Prof. Bruno Biais (Main Advisor)
    Directeur de Recherche at GREMAQ (CNRS)
    Toulouse University
    Email: biais@cict.fr
    Phone: +33 5-6112 8598
  • Prof. Ulf Axelson
    Research Fellow at SIFR
    Email: ulf.axelson@sifr.org
    Phone: +46 8-728 5126
  • Prof. Thomas Mariotti
    Chargé de Recherche at CNRS
    Toulouse University
    Email: mariotti@cict.fr
    Phone: +33 5-6112 8616
  • Prof. Per Strömberg
    Senior Research Fellow at SIFR
    Email: per.stromberg@sifr.org
    Phone: +46 8-728 5128


Working Papers

  • A Challenger to the Limit Order Book: the NYSE Specialist

    JOB MARKET PAPER

    Abstract: This paper gives a new answer to the challenging question raised by Glosten (1994): "Is the electronic order book inevitable?". While the order book enables traders to compete to supply anonymous liquidity, the specialist system enables one to reap the benefits from repeated interaction. We compare a competitive limit order book and a limit order book with a specialist, like the NYSE. Thanks to non-anonymous interaction, mediated by brokers, uninformed investors can obtain good liquidity from the specialist. This, however, creates an adverse selection problem on the limit order book. Market liquidity and social welfare are improved by the specialist if adverse selection is severe and if brokers have long horizon, so that reputation becomes a matter of concern for them. In contrast, if asymmetric information is limited, spreads are wider and utilitarian welfare is lower when the specialist competes with the limit order book than in a pure limit order book market.


  • Asset Choice Regulation in Mutual Funds - Working Paper (2005)

    Abstract: Should type of assets held by mutual funds be regulated? We investigate this issue in a costly-state verification model, where the regulator determines the class of assets in which mutual funds can invest, fund managers select the asset type under this constraint, and investors can, at a cost, control the performance of the manager. The optimal level of risk for the portfolio reflects the following trade-off: on the one hand risky assets magnify the manager's incentives to lie, on the other hand they enhance the incentives of the investor to monitor performance. We show that, if the mutual fund industry is not perfectly competitive, regulation helps protecting investors by restricting the discretion of the fund manager.

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